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Abstract
This paper studies the design of a social long-term care (LTC) insurance when altruism
is two-sided. The laissez-faire solution is not e¢ cient, unless there is perfect altruism.
Under full information, the rst-best can be decentralized by a linear subsidy on informal
aid, a linear tax on bequests when the parent is dependent and state specic lump-sum
transfers which provide insurance. We also study a second-best scheme comprising a
LTC benet, a payroll tax on childrens earnings and an inheritance tax. This scheme
redistributes resources across individuals and between the states of nature and the tax
on childrens labor enhances informal care to compensate for the childrens possible less
than full altruism.
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1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) is becoming a major concern for policy makers. Following the
rapid aging of our societies, the needs for LTC are expected to grow and yet there
is a lot of uncertainty as how to nance those needs; see Norton (2009) and Cremer,
Pestieau and Ponthière (2012) for an overview. Family solidarity, which has been the
main provider of LTC, is reaching a ceiling, and the market is remains rather thin.1 Not
surprisingly, one would expect that the state takes the relay.
This paper studies the design of social LTC insurance when both parents and children
are altruistic towards each other. Childrens altruism is however only partial. First, it is
only triggered by the occurrence of dependency and second it is limited. In a pure market
economy the dependent parents have to devote their resources to purchase professional
care services, but also to leave some bequests to boost informal care.
One cannot be but struck by two parallel evolutions: the soaring needs for LTC
and the growing share of inherited wealth in overall capital accumulation; see Piketty
and Zucman (2014). LTC is surely not a problem for the very wealthy households, but
for many households LTC can eat up most of their assets and make it impossible to
bequeath anything. It is thus not surprising that some people have thought of using
the proceeds of estate taxation to nance public long-term care. An example of this is
the English green paper proposing a voluntary inheritance levy. Accordingly, people in
England and Wales could pay a one-o¤ inheritance levy of up to £ 12,000 in return
for free public long-term care in their old age. The fee would either be deducted from
the estates of older people when they die or be paid when they enter retirement age.2
1The economic literature has identied a number of factors that can explain the low level of LTC
insurance demand. These include signicant loading factors due to high administrative costs, adverse
selection in the demand for insurance (Sloan and Norton, 1997; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Brown
and Finkelstein, 2007 and 2009) and the existence of cheaper substitutes like family care or public
assistance (Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Strüwe, 1998; Brown and Finkelstein, 2008).
2See http://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/jun/14/older-people-health-inheritance-levy, ac-
cessed 20th July 2015.
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The aim is to avoid forcing many pensioners to sell their family homes to fund massive
nursing home bills.
There is indeed a close link between bequests and long-term care. In a world without
a well-developed LTC insurance market, households are forced to oversave or to self-
insure. Consequently, in case of good health they end up with an excess of saving that
can lead to involuntary bequests. It is then clear that if it were possible to tax those
bequests, the proceeds could be used to nance long-term care. Actually if some type of
insurance, private or public were available, one would end up with the same result, that
is, a perfect smoothing of consumption between the two states of the world, dependency
or not. Brunner and Pech (2012) made that argument by showing that a tax on bequests
to nance LTC causes a smaller deadweight loss than an income or consumption tax.
This holds true whether or not the parents are altruistic. The problem is that in a world
with heterogeneous agents it might be impossible to distinguish bequests that are made
by dependent parents from those made by autonomous parents.
The matter gets more complicated when we look at the case of formal LTC nanced
by saving or insurance and informal services coming from children. For the time being
we assume that formal and informal care are complements. Dependent parents will have
to exchange those informal services against the prospect of some bequests. If children
are not altruistic, we will have a pure quid pro quo exchange; if they are altruistic they
might help their parents even if these cannot bequeath anything. The amount of help
will depend on the extent of lial altruism. In case of perfect altruism, children will
provide the optimal amount of assistance to their parents.
In a world of identical individuals, the social insurance scheme will serve two pur-
poses: it redistributes resources across the two states of nature and it induces the child
to help his parent. If individuals di¤er in the level of their wage, social insurance must
also redistribute resources across individuals.
To study these issues we consider a population consisting of one parent and one
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child families. Parents are pure altruists towards their child, while the childs altruism
may be imperfect. Parents are retired and have accumulated some wealth. They face a
probability of becoming dependent and needing LTC. The need of LTC requires expen-
ditures of some monetary amount. In case of dependency parents would like to benet
from the aid of their children, who are ready to help their parent out of altruism but
also with the expectation of some inheritance.3
We characterize the rst-best allocation and show that the laissez-faire is not ef-
cient, unless there is perfect altruism. Under full information the rst-best can be
decentralized by a linear subsidy on informal aid, a linear tax on bequests when the
parent is dependent, and state specic lump-sum transfers which provide insurance.
Next, we study the second-best allocation when the instruments available are lin-
ear (state independent) taxes on bequests and childrens labor income which nance a
transfer to the dependent elderly.4 Observe that the tax on childrens labor income is
in our setting e¤ectively equivalent to a subsidy on informal care.5
We rst consider a setting with ex ante identical individuals. We show that both
taxes should be positive. The tax on labor which subsidizes informal care compensates
for possible imperfect altruism; this is like in the rst-best implementation. Both taxes
also provide insurance, and that is relevant as the rst-best state specic lump-sum
transfers or taxes that provide full insurance are not available. Labor and bequest taxes
are then used to provide (partial) insurance.
Finally, we consider a setting with ex ante heterogenous families, which di¤er in
childrensproductivities and parentswealth. We show that the results obtained in
the homogenous family case carry over. However, the two tax rates now also include a
positive redistributive term. Throughout this paper private LTC insurance is assumed
3See Pauly (1990) for the preference parents have for assistance from their children.
4For non-linear schemes, see Jousten et al. (2006) and Pestieau and Sato (2009).
5Labor and informal care are the sole possible usages of childrens time. There is no leisure or the
amount of leisure is given.
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away. This is for the sake of simplicity but also because in most countries the LTC
insurance market is extremely thin; see Brown and Finkelstein (2007, 2009).
2 Identical individuals
2.1 The model setup
Consider a population of a size normalized to one, consisting of one parent (subscript
p) and one child (subscript c) families. Parents are pure altruists towards their child,
while a childs altruism may be imperfect. Parents are retired and have accumulated
wealth y. They face the probability  of becoming dependent and needing long-term
care. The need of LTC requires expenditures of amount L. In case of dependency the
parent would like to benet from the aid of his child, who is ready to help his parent
out of altruism but also when receiving some inheritance b. Parents choose the bequest
to their children. In case of autonomy, the child inelastically supplies one unit of labor
at a wage rate w. In case the parent needs long-term care, the childs time spend on
the labor market is reduced by the time spend for informal care provision a and gross
earnings amount to w(1 a). Care provided by the child reduces the monetary loss from
LTC by h(a)  L (with h0 > 0; h00 < 0) since then the parent requires less professional
care services.
In sum, the parents and childs expected utilities are given by
EUp = [H(y + h(a)  L  b) + u(w(1  a) + b)]
+ (1  )
h
u(y  bb) + u(w +bb)i ; (1)
EUc = [u(w(1  a) + b) + H(y + h(a)  L  b)]
+ (1  )
h
u(w +bb) + u(y  bb)i ; (2)
where  2 [0; 1] reects the childs degree of altruism and a b indicates the state of
staying healthy. The utility function u is the standard one whereas, H denotes the utility
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for long-term care. These functions satisfy u0;H 0 > 0 and u00;H 00 < 0. Furthermore, we
assume H(x) < u(x) for any x, due to the loss of autonomy.
The timing of the model is as follows: the government moves rst and announces
its policy (stage 0). Then, the parent and the child play the following two-stage game.
In stage 1, the parent chooses (for each state of nature) a level of bequest. In stage 2,
after the state of nature is revealed, children decide how much informal care to provide
if their parent is dependent. Otherwise, children simply consume their income plus the
bequest.
To determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve this game by backward
induction. We rst study the rst-best allocation which provides a benchmark against
which we can compare the laissez-faire allocation, obtained by dropping stage 0.
2.2 First-best solution
With ex ante identical families, we can dene the optimal allocation as the one max-
imizing the expected utility of a representative dynasty. Assuming that both parents
and children receive equal social weights, the rst-best problem can be written as
max
m;c;bm;bc;a W =  [H(m) + u(c)] + (1  ) [u(bm) + u(bc)] ;
s.t. (1  ) [bm+ bc  L] +  [m+ c] = y + (1  )w +  [w(1  a) + h(a)] ; (3)
where the decision variables are informal care provision a and parents and childs con-
sumption in both states of nature. We denote the latter by m, bm, c and bc respectively.
In the rst-best all variables are directly set, assuming full information and disregarding
the multi-stage structure of the game. The specication of the game will of course be
relevant below, when we study the decentralization of the rst-best optimum. Let 
denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint (3). The rst
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order conditions (FOCs) characterizing the optimal solution can be written as follows
H 0(m) = u0(bm) = u0(c) = u0(bc) = ; (4)
w = h0(a): (5)
Equation (4) states the equality of marginal utilities of incomes across generations and
states of nature (full insurance), while equation (5) describes the e¢ cient choice of
informal care. It states that the opportunity cost of informal care w equals its marginal
benet.
2.3 Laissez-faire allocation
2.3.1 Stage 2: Choice of children
In case of autonomy, children do not have to make any decision. They consume their
income and bequest, enjoying a utility u(w+bb). When their parents are in need of LTC,
they solve the following problem
max
a
u(w(1  a) + b) + H(y   L+ h(a)  b):
The rst-order condition of the above problem is given by
 wu0(w(1  a) + b) + H 0(y   L+ h(a)  b)h0(a) = 0:
This equation denes the optimal level of a as a function of b: a = a(b). We have
@a
@b
=
wu00(c) + H 00(m)h0(a)
SOCa
> 0; (6)
as the second-order condition (SOC) is negative
SOCa = w2u00(c) + H 0(m)h00(a) + H 00(m)(h0(a))2 < 0:
In words, if parents increase their bequest, the willingness to provide informal care by
the child also increases.
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2.3.2 Stage 1: Choice of parents
The problem of the parents is to choose (in both states of nature) the level of bequests
to their children. In case of dependency parents have more needs but at the same time
they might leave a higher bequest to induce more assistance from their children. Their
problem is the following
max
b;bb EUp = [H(y   L+ h(a)  b) + u(w(1  a) + b)]
+ (1  )
h
u(y  bb) + u(w +bb)i : (7)
Taking into consideration equation (6) the FOCs with respect to b and bb can be written
as
 H 0(m)

1  h0(a)@a

@b
(1  )

+ u0(c) = 0; (8)
  u0(bm) + u0(bc) = 0: (9)
It can be easily veried that for  = 1 the parent leaves the e¢ cient amount of bequests
so that H 0(m) = u0(c). This in turn goes hand in hand with an e¢ cient amount of aid
provided by the child h0(a) = w; see equation (5). This result is not surprising as for
perfect altruism, on both the parents and the childs side, the optimization problem of
the two family members coincides with the one of the social planner. Whenever  < 1
this is no longer the case as the child puts a too low value on the parents benets of
informal care. In this case the parent leaves a large than otherwise e¢ cient bequest to
induce the child to provide more care.
2.4 Decentralization of the rst-best allocation
Assume for the time being that there is no asymmetry of information so that all relevant
variables including informal aid are publicly observable. In the following we show that
the FB allocation within our multi-stage setting can be decentralized by a lump-sum
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transfer (social LTC insurance) from the healthy to the dependent elderly ( bD;D) sup-
plemented by a tax on labor income a and on bequests b for those children whose
parents are dependent. Public transfers must be chosen such that the governments
budget constraint
D = (1  ) bD +  [aw(1  a) + bb] (10)
is balanced.
2.4.1 Familys problem reconsidered
Again, in case of autonomy children do not have to make any decision; they consume
their income and bequest enjoying a utility u(w + bb). When their parents are in need
of long-term care, they now solve the following problem
max
a
u((1  a)w(1  a) + (1  b)b) + H(y +D   L+ h(a)  b): (11)
The rst order condition of the above problem is given by
 (1  a)wu0(c) + H 0(m)h0(a) = 0: (12)
The above equation yields a = a(b; a; b; D). The comparative static e¤ects wrt. b
and the policy instruments are6
@a
@b
=
(1  a)wu00(c)(1  b) + H 0(m)h0(a)
SOCa
> 0; (13)
@a
@a
=
 wu0(c)  (1  a)w2(1  a)u00(c)
SOCa
7 0; (14)
@a
@b
=
 (1  b)wbu00(c)
SOCa
< 0; (15)
@a
@D
=
 H 0(m)h0(a)
SOCa
< 0: (16)
Care increases with bequests while a tax on bequest dampens it. An income tax either
pushes or dampens informal care provision and public LTC decreases informal care.
6The second order condition is SOCa = ((1  a)w)2u00(c) + H 0(m)h00(a) + H 00(m)(h02 < 0.
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Comparison of equation (12) with the rst-best allocation (equations (4) and (5)) shows
that to implement the rst-best level of care we rst need a tax on childs income,
i.e. a = 1 . A tax on income implicitly subsidizes the childs informal care provision
so that the trade-o¤ between the childs marginal costs and marginal benet of care is
the e¢ cient one.
The problem for the parents is now the following
max
b;bb Up = [H(y +D   L+ h(a)  b) + u((1  a)w(1  a) + (1  b)b)]
+ (1  )
h
u(y   bD  bb) + u(w +bb)i : (17)
Using equation (12), the FOCs with respect to b, and bb are
 H 0(m)

1  h0(a)@a

@b
(1  )

+ (1  b)u0(c) = 0; (18)
  u0(bm) + u0(bc) = 0: (19)
Equations (18) and (19) yield b = b(D; bD; a; b) and bb = bb(D; bD; a; b). When the
transfers (D; bD) are chosen such that the parent (and thus also the child) is fully insured
implying H 0(m) = u0(bm) we have H 0(m) = u0(bc). The tax on bequests must then be
chosen such that its e¤ect on informal care is o¤set, i.e.
b = h
0(a)
@a
@b
(1  ) > 0:
That is, we have to tax bequests when the parent ends up being dependent. This tax
o¤sets the parents incentives to induce informal care above its rst-best level.7
To decentralize the rst-best optimum we need three types of tools: a distortionary
tax a that fosters childs assistance in case of impure altruism ( < 1); a tax b on
bequests when the parent is dependent and lump-sum transfers acting as redistributive
device between the two states of nature (D; bD).
7The expression for @a=@b is not independent of b.
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Note that we have assumed away private insurance. If private insurance were avail-
able, its role would depend on the existence and the size of loading costs. With zero
loading costs, a rst best could be achieved simply by taxing childs labor at the ap-
propriate rate, namely 1   , and by taxing bequests when the parent is dependent.
With positive loading cost, we also need the lump-sum transfers, which then completely
crowd out private insurance.
3 Second-best solution
3.1 Identical children
We now turn to the second-best. We assume that the government can use only linear
(proportional) taxes on bequests  and on labor earnings t, to nance a LTC benet g.
Tax rates cannot be conditioned on the parentshealth status. We use the notation t,
 and g rather then a, b and D to avoid confusion with the rst-best implementation.
With our instruments we write the revenue constraint as
g = t(1  a)w + 
h
b + (1  )bbi :
3.1.1 The childs problem
The child solves
max
a
u ((1  t)w(1  a) + (1  )b) + H (y   L  b+ g   h(a)) ; (20)
which apart from the change in notation is equivalent, to (11) so that the FOC continues
to be given by (12) and can be written as
(1  t)wu0(c) = H 0(m)h0(a): (21)
The solution is given by a = a(b; t; ; g). The comparative statics properties of this
function follow those described by equations (13)(16). Using subscripts to denote
partial derivatives, we thus have ab > 0; a

 < 0; a

t ? 0; ag < 0.
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3.1.2 Parents problem
Turning to the parents problem, it is given by
max
b;bb EUp = [H (y   L  b+ g + h(a)) + u ((1  t)w(1  a) + (1  )b)]
+ (1  )
h
u(y  bb) + u(1  t)w + (1  )bbi : (22)
The two FOCs wrt. bb and b are
u0(bm) = u0 (bc) (1  ); (23)
H 0(m)

1  h0(a)ab

= u0(c)[(1  )  (1  t)wab ]: (24)
Using (21), equation (24) can be rewritten as
H 0(m)

1  h0(a)(1  )ab

= u0(c)(1  ):
These conditions dene the bequests supply functions, i.e. b = b(t; ; g) and bb = b(t; ).
We implicitly assume positive bequests in either state of nature. Substituting for b
into a yields the level of aid as a function of the governments instruments a =
a (b(t; ; g); t; ; g)  ~a(t; ; g):
3.1.3 The governments problem
The second-best problem can now be expressed by the following Lagrangean
L(g; t; ) = [H (y   L  b + g + h(a)) + u ((1  t)w(1  a) + (1  )b)]
+ (1  )
h
u

y  bb+ u(1  t)w + (1  )bbi
  
h
g   t(1  a)w   (b + (1  )bb)i (25)
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Using the envelope theorem, we can write the FOCs wrt. g, t and  as
@L
@g
=

H 0(m)h0(a)  u0(c)(1  t)w ~ag + H 0(m)   [ + tw~ag   bg] = 0;
@L
@t
=

H 0(m)h0(a)  u0(c)(1  t)w ~at   u0(c) (1  a) + (1  )u0(bc)w
+ 
h
w(1  a)  tw~at + 
h
bt + (1  )bbtii = 0;
@L
@
=

H 0(m)h0(a)  u0(c)(1  t)w ~a   hu0(c)b + (1  )u0(bc)bbi
+ 
h
b + (1  )bb   tw~a +  hb + (1  )bbii = 0:
These FOCs can be rearranged using the compensated form with
dg
d
=
b + (1  )bb

; and
dg
dt
=
(1  a)w

:
In other words, we keep the tax rates t and  as sole decision variables, while accounting
of course for their impact on g, via the governments budget constraint. This yields8
@Lc
@
=
@L
@
+
@L
@g
dg
d
= (1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~ac  
h
u0(c)b + (1  )u0(bc)bbi
+H 0(m)(b + (1  )bb)   htw~ac    bc + (1  )bbci = 0; (26)
@Lc
@t
=
@L
@t
+
@L
@g
dg
dt
= (1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~act  

u0(c) (1  a) + (1  )u0(bc)w
+H 0(m)(1  a)w   
h
tw~act   

bct + (1  )bbcti = 0: (27)
To interpret these formulas, we make the standard assumption that the cross-derivatives
are negligible. Formally, bct = bbct = ~ac = 0. Then, we have
 =
 b   (1  ) bbb
 
h
bc + (1  )bbci ; (28)
t =
(1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~act   y   (1  ) bw
w~act
; (29)
8We dene ~acx =
@~a
@x
+ @~a
@g
dg
dx , b
c
x =
@b
@x
+ @b

@g
dg
dx and
bbcx = @bb@x + @bb@g dgdx , where x = ; t.
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where   u0(c)   H 0(m) ? 0 and b  u0(bc)   H 0(m) < 0.9 The denominators in
these two formulas are standard. They reect the e¢ ciency e¤ect of taxes. Normally
one expects ~act > 0 and
bc + (1  )bbc < 0:
To interpret the numerator of equation (28), we have to return to our assumption of
positive bequests and on the inequalities   u0(c)   H 0(m) ? 0 and b  u0(bc)  
H 0(m) < 0. As shown above in the rst-best,  = b = 0. The numerator will thus be
positive if  is not too high and if
 b >  > 0; which is likely if L is large enough.
Turning to the numerator of equation (29), note that the rst term in the nominator
vanishes if  = 1. Otherwise, it represents the need to foster childs assistance. This
term mirrors the rst-best implementation but has a di¤erent structure in the second-
best. The second and third terms are the same as in the previous condition. They
reect the insurance benets provided by the tax. They give the welfare gap between
the young and the dependent elderly in the two states of nature. If the marginal utility
of the dependent is high relative to that of the young, then there is a need for a higher
tax to nance the social benet g.
Private insurance would not change our qualitative results. Even with zero loading
cost, the rst-best cannot be achieved with the instruments considered here; it would
require a state-contingent inheritance tax. With a positive loading cost individuals
buy less than full insurance and the two taxes continue to make up for part of the
incompleteness of private insurance protection.
3.2 Heterogenous families
We now assume that families di¤er ex ante in the childrens productivity levels and in
the parentsresources. We assume that both (wi and yi) are positively correlated so
that our assumption of positive bequests is valid across families. Again, the government
9This means that bm > bc > c.
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levies a at tax t on earnings and  on bequests to nance a uniform LTC benet g.
Within such a framework the social insurance scheme pursues an additional objective,
namely redistribution.
The governments revenue constraint has to be modied such that
g =
X
i
ni
h
t(1  ai )wi + (bi + (1  )bbi )i ;
where ni is the relative number of families with productivity wi and yi. The optimizing
behavior of children and parents remains the same as described above; each child and
parent of type-i solves the problem given in (20) and (22). From this we obtain optimal
long-term care provision ai = ~a(t; ; g) with ~ai < 0; ~ait ? 0 and ~aig < 0 and optimal
bequests bi = b(t; ; g) and bbi = b(t; ):
3.3 Governments problem
The second-best problem of a utilitarian government with heterogenous families can be
expressed by the following Lagrangean expression
L(g; t; ) =
X
i
ni
n
H (yi   L  bi + g + h(ai )) + u ((1  t)wi(1  ai ) + (1  )bi )
+ (1  )
h
u

yi  bbi+ u(1  t)wi + (1  )bbii
  
h
g   t(1  ai )wi   

bi + (1  )bbiio: (30)
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Maximizing this expression with respect to g, t and  yields the following FOCs
@L
@g
=E
n
[

H 0(m)h0(a)  u0(c)(1  t)w ~ag + H 0(m)
   [ + tw~ag   bg]
o
= 0;
@L
@t
=E
n


H 0(m)h0(a)  u0(c)(1  t)w ~at   u0(c) (1  a) + (1  )u0(bc)w
+ 
h
w(1  a)  tw~aa + 

bt + (1  )bbtio = 0;
@L
@
=E
n


H 0(m)h0(a)  u0(c)(1  t)w ~a   hu0(c)b + (1  )u0(bc)bbi
+ 
h
b + (1  )bb   tw~a +  b + (1  )bbio = 0;
where we use the operator E for
P
i ni. As for identical families we can rearrange the
above FOCs in terms of compensations with dg=d and dg=dt; see Appendix (A.2). By
assuming that the cross derivatives are nil, i.e. bcit = bbcit = ~aci = 0, we have
 =
  cov(; b)  (1  ) cov(b;bb)
 E
h
bc + (1  )bbci
+
 EEb   (1  )E bEbb
 E
h
bc + (1  )bbci ; (31)
and
t =
(1  )E [H 0(m)h0(a)~act ]   cov(; w(1  a))  (1  ) cov(b; w)
Ew~act
+
 EEw(1  a)  (1  )E bEw
Ew~act
(32)
The interpretation of these two formulas is the same as in the case of identical individuals
with one exception, namely the covariance terms that are expected to be negative. This
is because with higher income/wealth the di¤erence in marginal utilities between states
of nature decreases. In other words, earnings inequality pushes for more taxation of
either earnings or bequests.
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4 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper is the concomitance of two trends: the increasing
needs for LTC, and unusual growth of inheritance. In a laissez faire economy with
neither public nor private insurance, dependency would bite a big chunk of accumulated
wealth with the consequence that bequests would greatly di¤er for kids with dependent
parents and kids with healthy parents. Childrens care can only partially mitigate those
di¤erences. Given that the market for LTC insurance is typically thin or even absent,
one has to rely on public action to restore some balance between the two states of
nature.
In a rst-best world, a subsidy on childrens care, state-dependent bequest taxes and
a state-contingent lump sum tax could achieve the optimum and provide full insurance.
If for obvious reasons individualized lump sum taxes are not available, one has to rely on
second-best schemes. In this paper a wage tax and a linear inheritance tax contribute
to nance a uniform LTC benet.
The main conclusion is that under plausible conditions linear taxes on both inher-
itances and wages to nance a public LTC at rate benet are desirable. The tax on
childrens labor income e¤ectively subsidizes informal care, like in the rst-best im-
plementation. It is required when altruism is less than full. Both taxes also provide
insurance and, in the case of heterogenous families (di¤ering in childrens productivity
and parents wealth) redistributive benets. We have seen that we can end up with
a subsidy of bequests or even earnings in the special case where the welfare of the
dependent would be quite high relative to that of his children and the probability of
dependency would be particularly high.
Throughout this paper we have assumed that parents in both states of nature were
leaving some bequests. This implies that parents are relatively wealthier than their
children, and that dependency does not represent a large nancial loss. In an extension
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of this work we would like to explore cases where some parents do not leave any bequest
or they only bequeath in the healthy state. It is expected that if bequests in the healthy
state were much higher than those in the state of dependency and if the wealthy families
were leaving high bequests whereas the poorer families were bequest-constrained, estate
taxation would play an even more important role. Among other extensions, we would
like to introduce private insurance with loading costs and study the possibility of non-
linear LTC policies.
A Appendix
A.1 Identical families: second-best
Using a shorter notation, we can write
 
h
u0(c)b + (1  )u0(bc)bbi+H 0(m)(b + (1  )bb) =  b   (1  ) bbb
  u0(c) (1  a) + (1  )u0(bc)w +H 0(m)(1  a)w =  (1  a)w   (1  ) bw
We now rewrite equations (26) and (27) as
(1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~ac   b   (1  ) bbb =  htw~ac    bc + (1  )bbci ;
(1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~act   (1  a)w   (1  ) bw =  htw~act    bct + (1  )bbcti :
A.2 Heterogenous families: second-best
@Lc
@
=E
n
(1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~ac  
h
u0(c)b + (1  )u0(bc)bbi
+H 0(m)(b + (1  )bb)   htw~ac    hbc + (1  )bbciio = 0; (33)
@Lc
@t
=E

(1  )H 0(m)h0(a)~act  

u0(c) (1  a) + (1  )u0(bc)w
+H 0(m)(1  a)w   
h
tw~act   
h
bct + (1  )bbctiio = 0: (34)
We use   u0(c)   H 0(m) ? 0 and b  u0(bc)   H 0(m) < 0; to represent the gap
between the childs marginal utility of consumption and that of the dependent parent.
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We now rewrite the FOCs as
(1  )E H 0(m)h0(a)~act   cov(; w(1  a))  (1  ) cov(b; w)
  EEw(1  a)  (1  )E bEw = E htw~act    hbct + (1  )bbctii ; (35)
(1  )E H 0(m)h0(a)~ac    cov(; b)  (1  ) cov(b;bb)
  EEb   (1  )E bEbb = E htw~ac    hbc + (1  )bbcii : (36)
Solving for t and  yields the expressions in the text.
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